SMTP RELAY FOR MICROSOFT 365
Say goodnight
to your last
Exchange Server.
Sendman is an SMTP relay for Microsoft 365 that lets printers, scanners and applications keep the logins they have, while you decide who may send as whom.
Private preview now open.
Sendman is built for every printer, scanner and application that only speaks plain SMTP. It authenticates them against Microsoft Entra ID or its own credential vault, fences them in by IP address and sender policy, and hands the mail to Exchange Online or the transport service you already use. The last on-premises Exchange Server has nothing left to do.
THE PROBLEM
The server that only exists for the printers
In almost every organization there is one Exchange Server left. Nobody reads mail on it. It is still running because a scanner, a nightly ERP export and an alarm panel need to send, and the only thing any of them knows how to do is open a port and authenticate.
Four dead ends
Everyone has tried at least one of these. None holds up.
- 01
Keep the Exchange Server running
You are patching a mail server so a scanner can email a PDF. Every Exchange advisory is now your weekend.
Dead end: The server stays - 02
Open an unauthenticated internal relay
Anything that can reach the connector can send as anyone in your domain. No identity, no sender control, nothing to audit afterwards.
Dead end: Control is gone - 03
Put one mailbox password on 200 devices
It cannot be rotated without visiting every device, and a copy of it is on a sticker in the copy room.
Dead end: Control is gone - 04
Point everything at a bulk sending service
Delivery works. Nothing on the way checks who is sending as whom, or to whom, and the shared API key is as good as a domain-wide send permission.
Dead end: Control is gone - 05 · The way out
All four are the same trade. You either keep a mail server alive for the sake of the devices, or you give up control over who is allowed to send as whom. Sendman is the option that refuses the trade.
Way out: Server gone, control kept
Follow one session from connection to delivery
Sendman sits in the SMTP conversation itself, not beside it. There are five moments where it decides something. Pick one and watch which part of the exchange it governs.
Change who is knocking and watch three policies decide
This is the real evaluation order, running live: the allow list, then the policies that apply to this identity and this address, then the sender, then every recipient on its own. Change any of the four and watch what the relay answers.
Policy 10 is scoped to svc-scan@contoso.com from 198.51.100.24. scan@contoso.com matches its allowed senders and accounting@contoso.com matches its allowed receivers, so Sendman opens its own session to the backend and hands the message over unchanged.
The policies being evaluated
Global allow list: 198.51.100.16 – 198.51.100.31, 192.0.2.128 – 192.0.2.143
svc-scan@contoso.com, from headquarters
senders: scan@contoso\.com
receivers: .*@contoso\.com
mfp-3f, from anywhere on the allow list
senders: .*@contoso\.com
receivers: .*@contoso\.com
Any device at headquarters, no sign-in
senders: noreply@contoso\.com
receivers: .*@contoso\.com
Policies are selected by scope, then reduced to the lowest priority number that applies. Policies that tie on priority are tried side by side, and a recipient is accepted only when one of them allows both the sender and that recipient. A sender from one policy never combines with a recipient from another.
Sendman does Exchange's last job and lets you decide who sends as whom
What each part of the relay does for your devices, with a page of its own for the details.
Connections and TLS
Devices send on port 587 with STARTTLS or on 465 with implicit TLS, and sign in only once the session is encrypted. A device that only speaks plain SMTP on port 25 sends through LNC, the Sendman tunnel.
Authentication
LOGIN and PLAIN are checked against Microsoft Entra ID or the Sendman credential vault, NTLM against the vault. Hybrid logins such as
CONTOSO\svc-scankeep working.Policies
The allow list decides who may connect. Policies decide whom a device may send as, and to whom, before a byte of the message is read.
Delivery
Exchange Online without SMTP AUTH, or the SMTP transport service you already use. Messages pass through unchanged.
Security and operations
What Sendman stores and how it is encrypted, who may change what in the portal, and what each session leaves behind.
Specifications
The names and numbers an admin asks for before the first test mail.
Connectivity
- Ports
- 465 with implicit TLS and 587 with STARTTLS over the internet, 25 only through LNC, the Sendman tunnel
- Certificate
- Renewed without a restart
- Allow list
- IPv4 address ranges, up to 16,384 addresses each
Authentication
- Mechanisms
- LOGIN, PLAIN, NTLM
- Identity sources
- Microsoft Entra ID for LOGIN and PLAIN (including hybrid DOMAIN\user logins), Sendman credential vault for LOGIN, PLAIN and NTLM
- Vault encryption
- AES-256-GCM
- TLS before login
- Required on every port except 25; a login without it gets 538 5.7.11
Policies
- Scope
- Username, IP range, or both
- Priorities
- Lowest number wins; on a tie, one policy must allow both the sender and the recipient
- Sender and recipient rules
- Regular expressions, enforced at MAIL FROM and every RCPT TO
- Anonymous relay
- Per policy, bound to an IP range
Delivery
- Backends
- Exchange Online (no SMTP AUTH), or SMTP transport services such as Amazon SES, SendGrid, Mandrill, Brevo
- Message size
- Up to 25 MB per message (your backend may allow less)
- Handling
- Passed through unchanged, no queue, no copy kept
Operations
- Configuration
- Platform Portal, live on the next connection
- Roles
- Viewer, admin
- Audit trail
- Who created every entry, who last changed each policy
- Event log
- Authentication failures and policy violations, searchable, with the rule that refused each one
- Telemetry
- Authentications, deliveries and session times, searchable in the portal, ready to alert on
- Certification
- glueckkanja is ISO 27001 certified
Microsoft is closing three paths your scanners use today
What each change means for a device that sends to Microsoft 365, and what Sendman does about it. Each page links Microsoft's dates and sources.
Basic Authentication for SMTP AUTH
Exchange Online is retiring Basic Authentication for SMTP AUTH, the username and password login of devices that send straight to Microsoft 365. Sendman reaches Exchange Online without SMTP AUTH, so the devices keep their logins.
Direct Send
Exchange Online can now reject Direct Send, the anonymous path that lets a scanner, or anyone else, drop mail into your tenant as one of your users. With Sendman in front, the scanner signs in or sends from an address range you allow.
Exchange 2016 and 2019
Exchange Online throttles, and in the end refuses, mail from Exchange 2016 and 2019 servers below the last public update Microsoft released for them. Sendman takes over the relay job, so the last server can go instead of being patched.
Three steps to switch off the last Exchange Server
- Point Sendman at your backendPoint Sendman at your backendChoose Exchange Online or the SMTP transport service you already send through, and enter what it needs. One form in the portal, and no redeployment when it changes.
- Let the devices in, and say what they may doLet the devices in, and say what they may doAdd the ranges they connect from, issue vault credentials to the devices that should not carry a directory identity, then write the policies for who may send as what, and to whom.
- Repoint DNS, retire the serverRepoint DNS, retire the serverPoint the hostname your devices send to at Sendman instead of the Exchange Server. For a device that sends with TLS on port 465 or 587, that is all it takes – the device itself is not touched. Devices that only speak plain SMTP on port 25 send through LNC, the Sendman tunnel, and the Exchange Server has nothing left to do.
The questions that come up first
What admins ask before the first test mail goes through.
01Does Sendman store our email?
No. It proxies the SMTP session and forwards it as it arrives. There is no mailbox, no queue, no spool and no archive, and the message itself is passed through unchanged, headers included. Sendman keeps your configuration; the addresses, user names and outcomes of each session go to the operator's logs, never the message.
02Do we have to register anything in our Entra tenant?
No. Sendman validates device credentials against Microsoft Entra ID with no app registration, no consent and nothing to change in your tenant. Hybrid logins such as CONTOSO\svc-scan work as they are.
03What about multi-factor authentication on those accounts?
Neither gets in the way. A vault credential never touches your directory, so there is nothing to prompt for. Entra ID accounts work as well: multi-factor authentication and Conditional Access do not stand in the way, even with strict policies, and the device never sees a prompt. What an account may send as, and to whom, is not a mailbox permission in Exchange Online but a Sendman policy: sender and recipient rules decide, for vault credentials and Entra ID accounts alike.
04Which devices need LNC?
Only the ones that cannot do TLS. A device that speaks implicit TLS on port 465 or STARTTLS on port 587 reaches Sendman over the internet, and repointing its hostname in DNS is all it takes. A device that only speaks plain SMTP on port 25 needs LNC, the Sendman tunnel: that port is not open to the internet, and every other port refuses a login before TLS. The SMTP settings of each device tell you which side of the line it is on.
05What if a device cannot do TLS at all?
It sends through LNC, the Sendman tunnel, on port 25. That port is not open to the internet, and it is the only one where a device may log in without TLS; identity, IP and policy are enforced there in exactly the same way. From Sendman onwards, the session is encrypted wherever the backend supports it.
06Can we keep Exchange Online as the backend?
Yes. Exchange Online can stay the delivery path, and Sendman adds the sign-in and policy layer your devices need in front of it. The backend can be changed later without touching a single device.
07How do we find out what a device is actually sending?
Every authentication failure and policy violation lands in the searchable event log, with the rule that rejected it named in the entry, and the reply the device receives tells you which gate refused it. Sniff Mode, a capture window that shows exactly what a device presents, its source address, the username it offers and the sender it claims, is on the roadmap.
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